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Abstract
Single-factor password-based authentication is generally the norm to access on-
line Web-sites. While single-factor authentication is well known to be a weak
form of authentication, a further concern arises when considering the possibil-
ity for an attacker to recover the user passwords by leveraging the loopholes in
the password recovery mechanisms. Indeed, the adoption by a Web-site of a
poor password management system makes useless even the most robust pass-
word chosen by the registered users. In this paper, building on the results of
our previous work, we study the possible attacks to on-line password recovery
systems analyzing the mechanisms implemented by some of the most popular
Web-sites. In detail, we provide several contributions: (i) we revise and de-
tail the attacker model; (ii) we provide an updated analysis with respect to a
preliminary study we carried out in December 2017; (iii) we perform a brand
new analysis of the current top 200 Alexa’s Web-sites of five major EU coun-
tries; and, (iv) we propose Maildust, a working open-source module that could
be adopted by any Web-site to provide registered users with a password re-
covery mechanism to prevent mail service provider-level attacks. Overall, it is
striking to notice how the analyzed Web-sites have made little (if any) effort
to become compliant with the GDPR regulation, showing that the objective to
have basic user protection mechanisms in place—despite the fines threatened by
GDPR—is still far, mainly because of sub-standard security management prac-
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tices. Finally, it is worth noting that while this study has been focused on EU
registered Web-sites, the proposed solution has, instead, general applicability.
1. Introduction
Although online Web-sites have always been attractive targets for attackers,
in the last years the phenomenon has intensified, typically leveraging the poor
password management implemented on the Web-site [29]. The victims of these
oversights are the registered users, that find themselves having to quickly change
the credentials, as a generic leakage compromised the currently used. A user
could be asked to be compliant with the well-known best practices to choose
a strong password but, if Web-sites’ password storage does not respect basic
security guidelines, such effort would be fruitless. LinkedIn, the professional
networking Web-site, and Yahoo, the Web-service provider, are two victims of
major data breaches in the last years [2, 34]. The former, after having found 6.5
million encrypted passwords of its users on a Russian Web-site in June 2012, in
May 2016 suffered another major breach that led to 117 million credentials for
sale on the Dark Web [3]. Although it was a Web-site that enjoyed an excellent
reputation with millions of active registered users, LinkedIn was implementing
poor cryptography techniques to protect the credentials of the users [17]. Re-
garding Yahoo, the company suffered one of the biggest data leakage ever (i.e., 3
billion users passwords exposed). It all started with a malicious phishing e-mail
sent by the attacker to an employee of the company. After an inattentive click
of the victim, a backdoor was installed in the internal system, that granted the
attacker access to the users’ database, containing all the personal information
of the registered users [36]. Although being critical, this episode is not the first
(and unfortunately, is not going to be the last) of its kind. Indeed, companies’
employees, that have often the privileges to access confidential user information,
are usually targeted by external attackers [37, 4, 24].
History teaches or, at least, it should. Given the enormous data breaches that
happened in the past, we expect the Web-sites to improve their security mea-
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sures, but the reality does not meet the expectations. In our previous work [27],
we highlighted how almost 44% of the top 200 Alexa’s Web-sites with the do-
mains registered in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the U.K., respectively,
did manage the recovery of users passwords in a way that could be compro-
mised by malicious users. In this work, the cited Web-sites have been analyzed
once again, to verify whether the entry into force of the General Data Protec-
tion Regulation (GDPR) has affected their management of the registered users’
passwords. As a result, we discovered that only a few Web-sites have strength-
ened their password management policies, while the vast majority still suffers
from the same vulnerabilities. To cope with the above-cited issues, we propose
Maildust, an innovative solution for password management and recovery that
solves some of the critical issues current Web-sites are affected by. Moreover, in
this work, we carry out a new analysis of the top 200 Alexa’s Web-sites with the
domains registered in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the U.K. respectively,
pointing out that an important percentage of such Web-sites, that are currently
among the most visited ones, still suffer from serious privacy concerns and are
not compliant with the regulation. Although the impact of these discoveries is
significant on its own, the effects on companies are amplified when considering
the GDPR, which is violated by the poor security measures adopted by Web-
sites.
The GDPR [14] introduction led to an extensive change in the perception of
data security and privacy. It has been proposed as an evolution of the Data
Protection Directive (DPP) and has become enforceable since May 25th, 2018.
The entry into force of the GDPR imposes enterprises, agencies, organizations,
and Web-sites, to guarantee protection by design on the personal data of their
users. Failure to comply with this regulation obliges the defaulters to pay sub-
stantial fines ranging from 10-20 million euros to a percentage (i.e., 2-4%) of
the previous financial year worldwide turnover—a measure that would likely put
out of business quite a few companies, if fined.
In our previous study, one of the most viable and dreadful attacks users
were exposed to could be performed by a mail service provider-level attacker,
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who has the capability to read, modify, and delete the user e-mails, as well
as starting the Web-site password recovery mechanism on behalf of the users.
To counter this threat, in this paper we propose Maildust, an open-source,
innovative solution to password recovery that is, by design, resistant to mail-
service provider attacks. Maildust has been released as a module that every
Web-site has the opportunity to adopt, allowing registered users to rely on a
secure password recovery mechanism. The source code of our proof-of-concept
is available here1. This will allow researchers, practitioners, and industries to
check our claims and to benefit of our source code as a ready-to-use basis for
their experiments.
Contributions. In this paper, we provide several contributions: first, we revisit
the attacker model, taking into account the password management security of
Web-sites; second, we revise the analysis of Web-sites considered in our previous
work, showing how most of their administrators have not made any effort to
make them compliant with the GDPR; then, we perform a brand new detailed
analysis of the current top 200 Alexa’s Web-sites with the domains registered
in some of the most populated European countries. Finally, considering that
the threat coming from mail service provider-level attackers is real, we propose
Maildust, an open-source module that could be adopted by any Web-site to
provide registered users with a password recovery mechanism preventing mail
service provider-level attacks.
Road-map. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reports the related
studies in the literature. Section 3 provides a technical background of user
authentication on Web-sites and of the password recovery mechanisms they are
currently relying upon. The attacker model is described in Section 4, while
Section 5 describes the adopted methodology and presents the results of our
analysis of the top Alexa’s Web-sites. Section 6 illustrates the implementation
1In the camera-ready of this manuscript, this will be a hyperlink pointing to the open-
source code
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of Maildust. Finally, Section 7 draws come concluding remark.
2. Related Work
Although critical, the data breaches suffered by both LinkedIn, in June 2012,
and Yahoo, in August 2013, represent only small tiles that make the cyberat-
tacks mosaic up. However, passwords (or rather, their management), which
have been the cause of these and many other attacks, are not losing their popu-
larity, still remaining the most adopted authentication mechanism on the web.
As soon as they were proposed, the scientific community immediately identi-
fied the fragility and the weaknesses of such an authentication technique [19].
For example, in [10], the authors reported a large-scale study involving half a
million users over three months. A client component installed on the users’ ma-
chine gathered and extracted both usage and frequency metrics of the passwords
typed. This allowed the authors to discover: (i) how many different passwords
are used by the users; (ii) how many accounts each user has; (iii) how often
passwords are used for more than a web service; and (iv), the type, the length,
and the strength of the passwords chosen by the users. According to the study,
each user has on average 6.5 passwords, that will be used to access approxi-
mately 3.9 different Web-sites. Moreover, each user has 25 accounts requiring
passwords and types, on average, 8 passwords per day. As per the strength of
the password chosen, every user, if not explicitly asked by the system, choose
lowercase-only passwords.
An empirical study about the strength of real-world passwords has been car-
ried out in [9]. In this work, the authors implemented state-of-the-art password
guessing techniques, including dictionary attacks, Markov chain-based strate-
gies, and mangling relying both on dictionaries and probabilistic context-free
grammars, to evaluate their effectiveness over datasets of known passwords.
Among their finding, they discovered that users put more effort into choosing
the proper username rather than their password. Furthermore, they stressed the
importance of the human component when it comes to the robustness of the au-
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thentication mechanism. Indeed, if users pay little (or no) attention to the choice
of their password, even the most sophisticated and secure systems risk of being
compromised. Given their convenience and the reduced number of false positive
and false negative compared to both “something you are” and “something you
have” mechanisms, we expect “something you know” mechanisms to be used for
years. This makes it crucial to guarantee adequate security for the storage of
user’s confidential information, as well as secure and protected mechanisms to
recover these information in case of theft or forgetfulness. Unfortunately, results
in the literature are not encouraging. Indeed, in [11], an assessment of password
practices on 10 popular Web-sites have been performed, including Google, Face-
book, Yahoo, Amazon, and YouTube. An analysis of the password selection,
the password recovery/reset mechanisms, and the restrictions enforced during
the password choice found all the Web-sites taken into account inadequate. It is
worth noting that the Web-sites considered in the study are among the most vis-
ited on the Web, thus making the outcome of the analysis even more worrying.
A possible solution has been introduced in [15], where the authors proposed an
authentication service based on one-time passwords, to eliminate the need for
preset users passwords during the authentication process. Those passwords are
delivered via ubiquitous communication infrastructures like instant messaging
services that, as well as mail service providers, should be trusted, a requirement
that nowadays cannot be guaranteed.
When a user loses or forgets her password, she generally relies on her e-mail
address to recover it, with the strong assumption that she is the only entity
having access. In a paper dated back to 2003, S.L. Garfinkel was wondering if the
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), used at that time, could have been substituted
by E-mail-based Identification and Authentication (EBIA) methods. The latter
consists of using the e-mail address as an identifier and considers the ability to
receive e-mails in that address as an authentication mechanism. In the same
study, the author identified two main vulnerabilities: (i) the security of this
mechanism is strongly dependant on the security of both e-mail servers and
passwords; and (ii) the content of e-mails could be accessed by server operators,
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who can intercept, read, as well as keep copies of e-mail messages directed
to the users. This mechanism, although being considered insecure in 2003, is
the currently used secondary authentication method nowadays, with the same
weaknesses left unresolved.
Authors in [20] surveyed password recovery e-mails for 50 out of the top
English language Web-sites, including Facebook, Dropbox, and Microsoft. The
analysis of the password recovery processes has highlighted how, most of them,
giving the little attention dedicated to the design, are likely to be extremely
prone to compromise. The authors in [18] realized the criticality of maintaining
a single point of failure (the e-mail of the user) as a recovery mechanism. They
examined 239 Web-sites, confirming that most of them use e-mails as the stan-
dard account recovery mechanism, and built an e-mail-based account recovery
attack. After identifying the capabilities of an attacker in this context, they
proposed a lightweight e-mail security enhancement against account recovery
attacks. The approach adds an extra layer of protection to password recovery
e-mails (i.e., e-mails that allow recovering a password). These e-mails will be
tagged, and the user can have access only after having successfully passed a
2-Factor Authentication challenge. Although this paper pointed out the vulner-
abilities affecting the e-mail-based password recovery methods, the authors did
not take into account mail service provider-level adversaries, that would easily
bypass the additional security measures adopted.
Relying on secure e-mail services, such as ProtonMail [26], could be an ef-
fective countermeasure. ProtonMail, an open-source e-mail service founded by
the CERN in 2014, does not log IP addresses and protects the privacy and the
anonymity of the users. Moreover, being end-to-end encrypted, the content of
the e-mail is indecipherable even by the mail-service provider itself. However,
malicious users could still compromise the account of the victim and jeopardize
her privacy on-line.
Other alternatives, aiming at improving the security of the secondary au-
thentication mechanism, have been introduced in the literature. In addition
to “something you have”, “something you are”, and “something you know”,
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also “somebody you know” [6] has been taken into account. The authors intro-
duced a process called vouching, in which a helper makes use of her primary
authenticator to support an asker in performing the secondary authentication.
A prototyping vouching system for SecurID is introduced, where a helper can
grant temporary access privileges to an asker who is no longer able to access the
service. Although interesting, this method requires a hardware authentication
token, hence “something you have”, a factor that is not implemented by most
existing Web-sites. In [30], the authors enriched the password recovery mech-
anism based on security questions with a keystroke analysis during the user’s
typing. This allows mitigating brute-force attacks, as well as easily guessable
secret questions and answers. However, this approach is renowned for having a
high number of false positives, thus jeopardizing the availability of the password
recovery mechanism.
In [31], the authors introduced a new social authentication approach based
on trustees, that will allow users to access their accounts after having forgotten
or lost the credentials. Trustees, that are people chosen by the account holders,
will have the burden of identifying the account holder either in person (identifi-
cation by appearance) or by phone (identification by voice). Once the account
holder has been identified, she is provided with an account recovery code that
will authenticate her in the system. Although this mechanism looks safer if
compared with the currently adopted password recovery methods, it may incur
in usability problems. Indeed, being people, trustees may not be available at the
time of need, making it impossible for the account holder to access the system.
A brief survey on the secondary authentication mechanisms has been intro-
duced in [28]. In this study, every authentication mechanism is evaluated in
terms of four criteria: (i) reliability, defined as the likelihood of the account
holder’s successful authentication; (ii) security, defined as the likelihood that an
attacker can impersonate an account holder; (iii) efficiency of the authentication,
defined as the time and effort required by the account holder to authenticate;
and (iv), efficiency of the setup, defined as the time, the effort, and the privacy
sacrificed by both the account holder and the Web-site to configure the au-
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thentication mechanism. The secondary authentication mechanisms taken into
account include security questions, previously used passwords, e-mail-based ver-
ification, printed shared secrets, trustees, in-person proofing, phones, and other
services. Although these mechanisms have been studied in detail, the modeling
of possible attackers, as well as the study of the security mechanisms adopted
by the Web-sites in the wild, were out of the scope of this paper.
Authentication cookies could be seen as possible substitutes for the user’s
credentials during the authentication sessions. As for credentials, their disclo-
sure would allow attackers to fully impersonate the user on the Web, exploiting
the victim’s privileges in the authenticated sessions. In [7], authors built a
dataset gathering 2,464 authentication cookies from a sample of 215 most pop-
ular Web-sites of Alexa’s ranking. As a result, they proposed the development
of a set of binary classifiers, aimed at identifying these authentication cookies
exploiting (supervised) machine learning techniques.
Considering the vulnerabilities identified in the mechanisms currently in use,
the need for finding alternatives is evident, to provide users with adequate se-
curity and privacy on the Web.
3. Background
In this section, the technical background of user authentication mechanisms
is provided, as well as a description of the password recovery mechanisms Web-
sites are currently relying upon. Furthermore, the Shamir’s Secret Sharing
scheme is introduced, instrumental to the realization of Maildust.
3.1. User authentication on Web-sites
Authenticating on a Web-site refers to the process in which an account holder
provides her credentials to the service. This service, once received the creden-
tials, compares them with those stored in the Web-site database (or in a cloud
server) to check whether there is a match. If such a match is found, the au-
thentication process is successful and the requesting account holder is granted
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authorization to access. Several authentication methods could be implemented
by a Web-site [12], and a combination of them leads to more accurate identifi-
cation of the user.
- 1-Factor-Authentication (1FA): In this authentication mechanism,
only one factor (e.g., “something the user knows”) is required to authen-
ticate a user. Being the simplest and the less expensive, 1FA is the most
common authentication mechanism adopted by Web-sites;
- 2-Factor-Authentication (2FA): In this authentication mechanism,
two factors are required to authenticate a user. In addition to “some-
thing the user knows”, the user has to present either “something the user
has” or “something the user is”. Examples of “something the user has” in-
clude smart cards or physical token, while “something the user is” refers to
biometrical information of the user, such as her voice, hand geometry, reti-
nal, iris, fingerprints, and possibly others. Many of the sensitive Web-sites
(e.g., banks) adopt this mechanism to strongly authenticate their users,
while it remains optional in others, such as Gmail [32] and ProtonMail [1].
- 3-Factor-Authentication (3FA): In this authentication mechanism, the
user needs to be authenticated with “something she knows”, “something
she has”, and “something she is”. Although it is the most secure of the
three authentication mechanisms, 3FA is also the most expensive one and,
therefore, has not found application on Web-sites yet.
3.2. Password recovery
Password recovery mechanisms, implemented by Web-sites, allow registered
account holders to recover their secret passwords in case of theft or forgetfulness.
There are many types of password recovery mechanisms, each with its charac-
teristics and weaknesses. The mechanisms that have been frequently adopted
by the Web-sites are reported below.
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3.2.1. Security Questions
In this password recovery mechanism, the requesting user is asked security
questions that, if answered correctly, allow the account holder to access.
Assumption. Only the account holder is able to correctly answer the secu-
rity questions.
The security questions could be standard, such as “What is your mother’s
maiden name?” or “What is the name of your cat?”, or could be customized by
the users. Regardless of this choice, many studies in the literature demonstrated
the limitations and the vulnerabilities of such a password recovery mechanism.
Indeed, in the information era, using a set of standard security questions is
quite insecure. Finding answers to questions such as “What is the name of
your primary school?” or “Who is your favorite actor?” becomes trivial by
surfing the personal information the account holder probably shared on social
networks. Even without relying on a standard set of security questions, but
on a customized set of them, several weaknesses have been identified. Indeed,
according to [16, 28], users should select security questions that are memorable,
reasonably unpopular with other users, not researchable on-line, and unknown
by any untrusted acquaintances.
3.2.2. Previously used passwords
In this password recovery mechanism, to get access to the account, the user
will be asked to provide one (or a set of) passwords that she has previously used
in the same Web-site.
Assumption The account holder, and only her, remembers all the passwords
she previously used on the Web-site.
Given that each person is able to remember only a limited number of pass-
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words, this password recovery mechanism inevitably leads to the use of the same
passwords for more than one Web-site. Adopting this mechanism, although with
some limitations (e.g., the account holder may not remember the passwords she
previously used in that specific Web-site) and some security problems (e.g., a
malicious user may have gotten some of the passwords the account holder pre-
viously used in that Web-site) is safer if compared with the password recovery
mechanisms currently adopted by Web-sites. It is worth to point out that this
mechanism cannot be adopted if the first password has been lost or stolen (i.e.,
there are no previously used passwords to rely upon).
3.2.3. E-mail-based authentication
The password recovery mechanism that is predominantly used by Web-sites
is the e-mail-based password recovery mechanism in which an account holder,
having lost or forgotten her credentials, relies on her e-mail account to get access
to the Web-site [13, 28].
Assumption. The account holder is the only entity that has access to her e-
mail account.
The different ways to implement the e-mail password recovery mechanism, to-
gether with the possible related security vulnerabilities, are detailed in the fol-
lowing.
- old password by e-mail (Old Pw). Once the account holder starts the
password recovery procedure, the Web-site sends her an e-mail containing
her original password. This is the most dangerous way to implement the
password recovery mechanism. Indeed, by knowing the original password
of the account holder, the Web-site proves not to use hash functions or
other mechanisms to avoid storing the passwords of the registered users
in clear. Given that most of the users make use of a limited number
of passwords to access many different Web-sites [23], this behavior could
bring to catastrophic consequences. If an attacker gets his hands on the
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password database of the Web-site, both the security and the privacy of
all the registered users are jeopardized. It is worth to notice that this way
of implementing the e-mail-based password recovery mechanism has been
deprecated more than 30 years ago [25].
- sending a new temporary password by e-mail (Temp Pw); Once the ac-
count holder starts the password recovery procedure, the Web-site sends
her an e-mail containing a temporary password, that she is forced to
change at the first access.
- sending a new (not temporary mail (New Pw); Once the account holder
starts the password recovery procedure, the Web-site sends her an e-mail
containing a new password. The Web-site does not force the account
holder to change the password at the first access. In this paper we con-
sider: weak the passwords with less than 250 combinations; medium the
passwords with more than 250 combinations; and strong the passwords
with more than 270 combinations; respectively.
- sending an HTTP link by e-mail (HTTP link); Once the account holder
starts the password recovery procedure, the Web-site sends her an e-mail
containing an HTTP link. If clicked, this link redirects the account holder
to the Web-site to choose a new password. In this study, we consider “vul-
nerable” the Web-sites that implemented the e-mail password recovery
mechanism this way. Indeed, the HTTP protocol does not guarantee any
insurance with respect to both man-in-the-middle and snooping attacks.
Being not encrypted, the communication between the account holder’s
browser and the Web-site could be intercepted, eavesdropped, and mod-
ified, thus jeopardizing both the integrity and the confidentiality of the
communication.
- sending an HTTPS link by e-mail (HTTPS link). Once the account holder
starts the password recovery procedure, the Web-site sends her an e-mail
containing an HTTPS link. If clicked, this link redirects the account
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holder to the Web-site to choose a new password. It is worth to notice
that this is the safest way of implementing the e-mail-based password
recovery procedure.
3.2.4. Other password recovery mechanisms
The literature boasts many studies proposing alternative approaches to effi-
ciently implement password recovery on Web-sites. Some of them propose a kind
of multi-device authentication, where a cell-phone receives an SMS message (or
a phone call) from the Web-site, containing information to access the account.
As for e-mail-based authentication, also this approach relies on the assumption
that only the device holder is able to access a secret sent to the device [28]. Mul-
tiple devices are also needed for the solution proposed by [6], where the authors
introduced a process called vouching, in which a helper makes use of her primary
authenticator to support an asker in performing the secondary authentication.
A prototyping vouching system for SecurID is introduced, where a helper can
grant temporary access privileges to an asker who is no longer able to access the
service. This approach is safer than the ones currently implemented but requires
a hardware authentication token. Other approaches, instead, rely on people to
securely recover the password. In [31], for example, the authors introduced a
new social authentication approach based on trustees. Trustees are people se-
lected by the account holder that will have the burden of identifying her either
in person (identification by appearance) or by phone (identification by voice).
Once the account holder has been identified, she is provided with an account
recovery code that will authenticate her in the system. As highlighted in the
previous section, this mechanism is safer if compared with the currently adopted
passwords recovery mechanisms but it may incur in availability problems, that
would jeopardize its usability.
3.3. Shamir’s Secret Sharing Scheme
The Shamir’s Secret Sharing Scheme [33] allows to divide any data D into n
tokens D1 . . . Dn , such that:
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- k tokens (k ≤ N) will be enough to reconstruct D; and,
- the knowledge of k− 1 tokens reveals absolutely no information about D.
The Shamir’s Secret Sharing Scheme is based on polynomial interpolation: in a
bi-dimensional plane, given j points (x1, y1), . . . , (xj , yj) with x1 6= x2 6= . . . 6= xj
there is only one polynomial function f of degree j − 1 such that ∀i f(xi) = yi.
Given this premise, to divide D into tokens D1 . . . Dn, a random j − 1 degree
polynomial f(x) = t0 + t1x+ . . .+ tj−1xj−1 is picked, where t0 = D. Then the
function D1 = f(1), D2 = f(2), . . . , Di = f(i), . . . , Dn = f(n) is evaluated. Any
k-sized subset of these Di values and their identifying indices allows to find the
coefficients of f(x) by interpolation, thus evaluating D = f(0).
We apply the Shamir’s Secret Sharing Scheme to the password generated by our
open-source password recovery module. The tokens obtained will be distributed
over the password recovery resources provided by the user during the registration
to the Web-site. The goal is to allow users to reconstruct the new password even
if one or more password recovery resources are compromised.
4. Adversary Model
Given the dynamic ecosystem of Web-sites, we model several categories of
adversaries, summarized in Table 1. An adversary may be passive or active. A
passive attacker does not interact with the Web-site, while an active attacker
could perform different actions, including starting the password recovery pro-
cedure on behalf of the account holder. Furthermore, an adversary may be
detectable or undetectable. An attacker is detectable if, once impersonating the
account holder, is forced to leave traces (i.e., the account holder has a chance
of being aware, or at least suspicious, that an impersonation could have hap-
pened). Conversely, an attacker is undetectable if she has the opportunity of
impersonating the account holder without leaving any trace.
The goal of the attacker, being her active or passive, is to obtain the creden-
tials of the account holder to impersonate the victim on the Web-site. Being
15
detectable or undetectable strongly depends on the password recovery mecha-
nism adopted by the Web-site.
We introduce four possible attacks against a target account holder, who has
an account on a target Web-site:
- Mail service provider-level attack;
- Web server intruder attack;
- Client intruder attack; and,
- Sniffing attack.
Table 1: Attackers types
Type Passive Active
Detectable No ability of interacting with
the Web-site and traces will be
left behind
Ability of interacting with the
Web-site but traces will be left
behind
Undetectable No ability of interacting with
the Web-site but no traces will
be left behind
Ability of interacting with the
Web-site but no traces will be
left behind.
Table 2: Attackers resources and possible accesses
Attackers/Access User e-mails Web-site
password DB
Web-site
password
recovery method
Mail service
provider-level
3 7 3
Web server intruder 7 3 3
Client intruder 3 7 3
Sniffing 7 7 3
A mail service provider-level attack can be performed by a malicious service
provider, as well as by a malicious user that compromised the mail service
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provider. In this case, the attacker would have access to every e-mail of the
account holder, thus having the opportunity to obtain a lot of sensitive and
confidential information. A web server intruder attack can be performed by
an attacker that violated the Web-site. Such an attacker would have access to
the database in which the passwords of the users are stored. A client intruder
attack can be performed by an adversary that violated a user’s device. This
adversary may have stolen the device or obtained some kind of remote access
on it. Finally, the sniffing attack can be performed by any attacker that has
information about the Web-site password recovery method. It is worth to notice
that obtaining such information is easy, since every user can register an account
and pretend to have lost the password. Furthermore, this last attacker has the
opportunity to sniff the traffic between the client and the Web-site during their
communication. Without loss of generality, we assume that the sniffer attacker
cannot read the content of the e-mails.
The resources the adversaries can access and the actions the adversaries can
perform are summarized in Table 2, while their capabilities are described in
Section 4.1.
4.1. Attackers capabilities
The capabilities of the attackers, as well as their characteristics, are described
in this section. The result of the analysis are summarized in Table 3 for passive
attackers, and in Table 4 for active attackers.
4.1.1. Mail service provider-level attacker
By having access to the e-mails of the account holder (i.e., the emergency
authentication mechanism adopted by most Web-sites), a passive mail service
provider-level attacker may obtain the credentials of the victim in any case, re-
gardless of which password recovery mechanism the Web-site adopts. However,
in case the Web-site adopts either Old Pw or New Pw recovery mechanisms, the
attacker would be able to impersonate the account holder without leaving any
trace behind, thus remaining undetectable. Indeed, the attacker could read the
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Table 3: Synoptic table related to passive attackers
Attacks /
Recovery
methods
Old Pw New Pw Temp Pw HTTP link HTTPS
link
Mail service
provider-
level
undetectable undetectable detectable detectable detectable
Web server
intruder
undetectable storage
method
storage
method
storage
method
storage
method
Client
intruder
undetectable undetectable detectable /
user’s
behavior
detectable /
user’s
behavior
detectable /
user’s
behavior
Sniffing undetectable undetectable undetectable undetectable undetectable
original password sent by e-mail to the account holder by the Web-site. From
that moment on, the account holder and the attacker could share the same
account on the Web-site, without the former being aware of it. The attacker
would be detectable in case the Web-site adopts any other e-mail-based pass-
word recovery mechanism. For example, in case the Web-site adopts HTTP link,
HTTPS link, or Temp Pw, the attacker could access the link on behalf of the
account holder, thus having access to the Web-site, but will be forced to change
the password, no longer granting access to the account holder. However, The
attacker may delete the e-mail after having accessed the link (or used the new
password). When the account holder wants to access the system her password
will not work, but she could think of a malfunction of the Web-site. In the
meantime, the adversary may have logged-in, obtained the needed information,
and logged-out, with good chances of not being suspected at all.
If the Web-sites stores the passwords of the users in clear, also the active mail
service provider-level attacker could remain undetectable. Indeed, when the at-
tacker starts the recovery procedure on behalf of the account holder, she can
obtain the original password by-email. The e-mail could then be deleted before
the victim could access it. In the event other password recovery mechanisms
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are adopted, the password would change. Even in this case, the compromising
e-mail could be deleted by the mail-service provider before the victim has the
opportunity of accessing it. The account holder would have no longer access to
the Web-site, but she could wrongfully think of a Web-site malfunction or to
have forgotten the password, thus exonerating the adversary.
4.1.2. Web server intruder attacker
The password storage management of the (violated) Web-site is determining
to understand which information a passive Web server intruder attacker may
obtain. Indeed, if the Web-site stores the passwords in clear (i.e., without relying
on hash functions), the attacker could transparently make use of the credentials
of the victim to get access.
An active Web server intruder attacker would have the same capabilities of a
passive one, dictated by the password storage management adopted by the Web-
site. The only difference concerns the traces left behind. Indeed, in case the
attacker interacts with the password recovery module of the Web-site on behalf
of the victim, she will not be able to delete the e-mail. The account holder
would receive an e-mail containing instructions for recovering the password and
would become suspicious.
4.1.3. Client intruder attacker
Most likely having access to the e-mails of the account holder (i.e., most
of the users do not want to insert their passwords from scratch every single
time, allowing the browser to remember them [35]), a passive client intruder
attacker that has access to the device of the account holder would have the
same capabilities of a mail service provider level attacker. In case the account
holder does not rely on browsers shortcuts to remember the credentials, an
attacker with either remote or temporary physical access to the device has the
opportunity to install a key-logger software. This would allow the attacker to
capture the input of the account holder, including the password typed. Besides,
the remote (or physical) access to the device would allow the attacker to find
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Table 4: Synoptic table related to active attackers
Attacks /
Recovery
methods
Old Pw New Pw Temp Pw HTTP link HTTPS
link
Mail service
provider-
level
undetectable detectable detectable detectable detectable
Web server
intruder
undetectable detectable /
storage
method
detectable /
storage
method
detectable /
storage
method
detectable /
storage
method
Client
intruder
undetectable detectable detectable detectable detectable
Sniffing detectable -
useless
detectable -
easier
detectable -
easier
detectable detectable
password files of the account holder [39]. In this case, the attacker’s capabilities
will be dependant on the behavior (and the habits) of the account holder.
The capabilities of an active client intruder attacker are the same of the passive
client intruder attacker, since the interaction with the Web-site would not bring
any benefit.
4.1.4. Sniffing attacker
A passive sniffing attacker has mainly three ways to obtain the credentials
of an account holder: (i) the attacker intercept the HTTP communications
between the account holder and the Web-site; (ii), the attacker performs a man-
in-the-middle attack during an HTTPS communication between the account
holder and the Web-site; or (iii), the adversary brute-forces the Web-site to
guess the credentials of the account holder, respectively. In the brute-forcing
event, in case the Web-site does implement neither protection mechanisms (e.g.,
Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart
(CAPTCHA), blocking the access after a maximum number of login attempts)
nor warning systems (e.g., e-mail or SMS to the account holder after a maximum
number of login attempts), if the attacker guesses the password she will be able
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to impersonate the victim before the latter being aware of it.
In other cases, the capabilities of an active sniffing attacker depend on the
password recovery mechanism adopted by the Web-site:
• Old Pw : when the attacker starts the password recovery procedure on be-
half of the user, the Web-site sends the account holder an e-mail containing
her password. This procedure, besides making the attacker detectable (be-
cause the user will receive the e-mail) is also fruitless, since the attacker
would not get any advantage (i.e., the password to brute-force would be
the same).
• New Pw or Temp Pw : if the Web-site adopts such password recovery
mechanisms, the password recovery procedure started by the attacker on
behalf of the account holder would give her precious information about
the password to brute-force. Indeed, even if the user during the registra-
tion chose an incredibly strong password, the attacker would ask for a new
one on behalf of the account holder. This gives the attacker useful infor-
mation about the password to brute-force, since she would know both its
structure and its level of security. Let us suppose that the account holder
has an extremely hard-to-guess password. The attacker, that wants to
impersonate the account holder, creates a personal account on the target
Web-site and asks (for several times) for the password recovery procedure,
thus obtaining information about the passwords generated by the Web-site
(e.g., 6-characters passwords without capital letters). Once obtained this
information, the attacker would start the recovery procedure on behalf of
the account holder that, without being aware of it, will be associated with
an easier-to-guess password.
• HTTP link or HTTPS link : without having access to the e-mails of the
user, the attacker will become detectable and will not gain any additional
information about the password.
Note that being active or passive has consequences on both the attack timing
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and the attack extension. Indeed, on the one hand, active attackers may obtain
the credential of the account holder at any time, while passive attackers have
to wait for an action from the account holder. On the other hand, an active
attacker has to be controlled by a human, to take immediate actions, while
passive attackers may be implemented as autonomous software and triggered
when specific events happen (e.g., receiving an e-mail with links or credentials).
This makes passive attackers easy to implement and to spread.
5. Methodology and Results
In this section, we first describe the methodology to analyze the security of
the Web-sites’ password management. Then, we provide the results of three
analysis: in the first analysis we analyze the password management security
of the top Alexa’s 200 Web-sites with the domains registered in five European
countries: France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the U.K., respectively, in the
period of December 2017; in the second analysis we analyze the same Web-sites
of the same countries in the period of December 2018 (i.e., one year later); and,
finally, we perform the current top 200 Alexa’s Web-sites of the same countries
in the period of December 2018. The goal is to understand whether the entry
into force of the GDPR has affected the password management of both the
Web-sites that were popular (i.e., the most visited ones) at the time of the first
analysis (i.e., December 2017) and the Web-sites that are popular one year later
(i.e., after the GDPR’s entry into force).
5.1. Methodology
In the methodology we made two independent choices: (i) how to choose the
Web-site to consider for the analysis; and (ii) how to analyze the selected Web-
sites. As for the first choice, we relied on the Amazon Alexa Web service [38].
Amazon Alexa provides a Web service called “top sites”, in which Web-sites
are listed according to the Alexa’s Traffic Rank. Such a ranking, that is daily
updated, is determined by a combination of unique visitors and page views of
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Web-sites [5]. We first selected a subset of European countries subject to the
GDPR regulations: France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the U.K.–till Brexit
happens, the U.K. is subject to GDPR as well, respectively. Then, for each
country, we took into account the first 200 Web-sites according to the ranking
of Alexa’s top sites. We chose the top ones since, as the ranking goes down, the
impact of the Web-sites (that are less and less visited) decreases. We created
an account on the Alexa’s Web-sites and we started the collection of the URLs.
It is worth to notice that Amazon Alexa provides multiple ways to obtain the
top-sites. Indeed, they may be grouped according to three major filters: global,
by country, and by category. As the name suggests, the global division allows to
obtain the most visited Web-sites globally. The “by country” division, instead,
allows to obtain the most visited Web-sites from the selected countries. The
domain of these Web-sites could not be registered in the selected countries
(e.g., YouTube.com, the most famous video-sharing platform, although being
registered in California, United States, is in the top five of all the countries we
considered in this study). The third division allows to obtain the top Web-sites
according to further labels (e.g., arts, regional, sports, computers to name a
few). With this filter we were able to choose the specific country, thus obtaining
the top 200 Web-sites with the domains registered in the countries we selected.
Once obtained the URLs of the Web-sites, we performed a detailed analysis to
study the security of their password storage management.
The second phase starts with the selection of the Web-sites requiring user
registration among the top 200 of each country. Once selected, a further filter-
ing allowed us to remove the Web-sites that, during the registration, required
the user to insert privileged information (e.g., the account number for banks,
the customer code for wholesalers the id numbers for universities, and possi-
bly others). After this filtering phase, we manually analyzed each Web-site to
obtain detailed information about the password management. It is worth to
notice that, although this activity took some amount of time (i.e., around three
months), the quality and the detail of the results are invaluable. In detail, for
each of the Web-site to analyze:
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- we registered a user account with a new e-mail gdpr.experiment@gmail.com,
a Gmail account created ad-hoc for the analysis;
- we started the recovery procedure, pretending to have lost the password;
and,
- we collected information about the password recovery mechanism.
5.2. First Analysis: Top 200 Alexa’s Web-sites with the domains registered in
five European countries (December 2017)
In this section, we provide the analysis of the top 200 Alexa’s Web-sites
with the domains registered in five European countries: France, Germany, Italy,
Spain, and the U.K., respectively, in the period of December 2017. We first
provide details about the filtering phase, in which we remove Web-sites we
are not able to analyze, then we introduce the password recovery mechanisms
adopted by the Web-sites we take into account.
5.2.1. Filtering phase
As described in Subsection 5.1, the Web-sites have been filtered to remove
both those that do not require authentication and the ones requiring, for the
registration phase, information that we are not able to produce (e.g., id numbers
for universities, account number for banks) Of the 1,000 Web-sites, 722 did not
require authentication—and hence were excluded by our study—, while out of
the remaining 278, we focused on 174—since 104 demanded information we
could not produce. The results of this filtering are shown in Table 5: most of
the Web-sites taken into account have the domain registered in the U.K., (i.e.,
71, approximately 40.8%), while only a few Web-sites from Germany and Spain
appear to require authentication from the user, 17 (≈ 9.7%) and 19 (≈ 10.9%),
respectively.
The results of the analysis are shown in Table 6. Each column of the table
represents a different password recovery mechanism adopted by the analyzed
Web-sites—these password recovery mechanisms can be observed from left to
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Table 5: Number of analyzed Web-sites among the top 200 per country (December 2017)
Country Web-sites (#)
France 31
Germany 19
Italy 36
Spain 17
U.K. 71
Total 174
Table 6: Password recovery mechanisms adopted by the analyzed Web-sites (December 2017)
Country
Web-
sites
(#)
Old Pw New Pw Temp
Pw
HTTP
link
Vulnerable
Web-sites
(%)
France 31 0 10 0 7 54.84
Germany 19 1 1 0 5 36.84
Italy 36 4 11 1 4 55.55
Spain 17 2 5 0 1 47.06
U.K. 71 1 5 2 16 33.8
Total 174 8 (4.6%) 32 (18.4%) 3 (1.7%) 33 (19%)
right in decreasing order of severity. Of the 174 Web-sites, 8 Web-sites (≈ 4.6%)
make use of the Old Pw password recovery mechanism, thus storing the pass-
words in clear, 32 Web-sites (≈ 18.4%) make use of the New Pw password
recovery mechanism, 3 Web-sites (≈ 1.7%) use the Temp Pw password recovery
mechanism, while 33 Web-sites (≈ 19%) allow users to recover the password
through an HTTP link, for a total of 43.7% of vulnerable web-sites.
Table 7: Password robustness analysis
Password > 210 > 220 > 230 > 240 > 250 > 260 > 270
New 100% 93.75% 75% 62.5% 3.125% 3.125% 3.125%
Temporary 100% 100% 100% 100% 33.33% 0 0
Given the popularity of the New Pw password recovery mechanisms, we have
carried out further investigations to analyze the security behind the process of
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Table 8: Old Analysis (December 2017) vs New Analysis (December 2018)
Country
Web-
Sites
(#)
Old Pw New Pw Temp Pw HTTP
Link
Vulnerable
Web-sites
(%)
’17 ’18 ’17 ’18 ’17 ’18 ’17 ’18 ’17 ’18 ’17 ’18
France 31 33 0 0 10 10 0 0 7 5 54.84 45.45
Germany 19 16 1 1 1 1 0 0 5 4 36.84 37.5
Italy 36 34 4 4 11 11 1 1 4 3 55.55 55.88
Spain 17 17 2 2 5 4 0 0 1 2 47.06 47.06
U.K. 71 74 1 1 5 3 2 2 16 16 33.8 29.7
Total 174 174 8 8 32 29 3 3 33 30
generating new passwords. In particular, we obtained this information by re-
questing a new password 125 times, and by analyzing the passwords provided
by the Web-sites. For example, AKRBA2Y1, 321fr26f, xlpeor are three pass-
words sent by a given Web-site after having started the recovery procedure. In
this case, the passwords are composed of uppercase or lowercase letters, num-
ber, but no special characters, with an overall length of maximum 8 characters.
The strength of the passwords created by this Web-site has been computed
as 628 ≈ 248. Table 7 details the analysis of the passwords; according to our
evaluation, only 3.125% of Web-sites choose passwords that could be consid-
ered decent, while more than 90% are considered weak. This poor password
choice makes the Web-sites prone to brute-force attacks performed by sniffing
attackers.
5.3. Second Analysis: Top 200 Alexa’s Web-sites with the domains registered in
the five European countries—one year later (in December 2018)
In this section, we provide a new analysis of the same 200 Alexa’s Web-
sites of the five countries carried out in December 2017, one year later (i.e., in
December 2018). The goal is to understand if the entry into force of the GDPR
has led to improvements on the Web-site’s password management security.
Table 8 depicts the changes that have taken place in the Web-sites’ password
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recovery management one year apart—before and after the entry into force of
the GDPR, respectively. Note that, in spite of some negligible changes, the Web-
sites did not do their best to become compliant with the regulation. Indeed, in
December 2017, 43.7% of Web-sites were vulnerable, while in December 2018
the percentage became 43.12, showing an almost negligible improvement. In the
following, for each country, we specify what changes have been highlighted by
the analysis.
5.3.1. United Kingdom
The English Web-sites have imperceptibly improved the security of their
password recovery management, indeed the percentage of the vulnerable Web-
sites decreases from 33.8% to 29.7%. In detail, by the results of the new analysis,
we note that:
- 68 Web-sites have not changed their password recovery mechanism;
- 4 Web-sites that were not working during the first analysis now work, and
allow the registration of user accounts. The password recovery mechanisms
adopted are HTTPS link for 3 Web-sites and HTTP link for 1 Web-site,
respectively;
- 2 Web-sites have changed their password recovery mechanism from New
Pw to HTTPS link ; and
- 1 Web-site (that was managing its password recovery with the HTTP link
mechanism) no longer allows the user registration.
5.3.2. France
French Web-sites have improved the security of their password recovery man-
agement more significantly, lowering the percentage of vulnerable Web-sites from
54.84% to 45.45%. In detail, by the results of the new analysis, we note that:
- 27 Web-sites have not changed their password recovery mechanism;
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- 2 Web-sites that were not working during the first analysis now work, and
allow the registration of user accounts. These Web-sites both adopt the
HTTPS link password recovery mechanism;
- 3 Web-sites have changed their password recovery mechanism from HTTP
link to HTTPS link ; and
- 1 Web-site has changed its password recovery mechanism from HTTPS
link to HTTP link.
5.3.3. Germany
The German Web-sites have not made security improvements for password
recovery management, in fact, the percentage of vulnerable Web-sites has changed
from 36.84% to 37.5%. In detail, by the results of the new analysis, we note
that:
- 15 Web-sites have not changed their password recovery mechanism;
- 1 Web-site has changed its password recovery mechanism from HTTP link
to HTTPS link ;
- 2 Web-sites do not work anymore, they were both employing the HTTPS
link mechanism; and
- 1 Web-site (that was managing its password recovery with the HTTPS
link mechanism) no longer allows the user registration.
5.3.4. Italy
Most of the Italian Web-sites, as well as the German ones, have not made
efforts to be compliant with the regulation. The percentage of vulnerable Web-
sites has changed from 55.55% to 55.88%. In detail, by the results of the new
analysis, we note that:
- 31 Web-sites have not changed their password recovery mechanism;
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- 1 Web-site has changed its password recovery mechanism from HTTP link
to HTTPS link ;
- 1 Web-site has changed its password recovery mechanism from New Pw
to HTTPS Link ;
- 2 Web-sites do not work anymore, they were employing the HTTP link
mechanism and the HTTPS link mechanism, respectively;
- 1 Web-site (that was managing its password recovery with the New Pw
mechanism) no longer allows the user registration; and
- 1 Web-site that was not working during the first analysis now work, and
allows the registration of user accounts. This Web-site adopts the New
Pw password recovery mechanism.
5.3.5. Spain
Even the Spanish Web-sites, as depicted in Table 8, have not made efforts
to be compliant with the regulation. Indeed, the percentage of vulnerable Web-
sites is exactly the same (i.e., 47.06%). In detail, by the results of the new
analysis, we note that:
- 15 Web-sites have not changed their password recovery mechanism;
- 1 Web-site has changed its password recovery mechanism from New Pw
to HTTPS link ;
- 1 Web-site does not work anymore, it was employing the HTTPS link
mechanism; and
- 1 Web-site that was not working during the first analysis now work, and
allows the registration of user accounts. This Web-site adopts the HTTP
link password recovery mechanism.
The posthumous analysis to the entry into force of the GDPR shows how the
Web-sites, although being among the more popular ones as they were occupying
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the top positions of Alexa’s ranking in December 2017, continue to not comply
with the regulation and risk incurring the heavy fines envisaged.
5.4. Third Analysis: Top 200 Alexa’s Web-sites of five European countries (De-
cember 2018)
In this section, we provide an analysis of the top 200 Alexa’s Web-sites of
the five countries carried out in December 2018, a few months later the entry
into force of the GDPR. The goal is to understand if the entry into force of the
GDPR has improved the password management security of the Web-sites that
were currently between the most popular according to the Alexa’s ranking. As
for the first analysis described in subsection 5.2, we first provide details about
the filtering phase, in which we remove Web-sites demanding information we
cannot produce, then we introduce the password recovery mechanisms adopted
by the Web-sites considered.
5.4.1. Filtering Phase
As described in subsection subsection 5.1, the Web-sites have been filtered
to exclude both those that do not require authentication and the ones that
demand information we are not able to produce. Of the 1,000 Web-sites, 687 do
not require authentication—and hence have been excluded by our analysis—,
while out of the remaining 313, we focus on 195—since 95 demanded information
we cannot produce and 23 were not working during the analysis.
Table 9: Number of analyzed Web-sites among the top 200 per country (December 2018)
Country Web-sites (#)
France 34
Germany 18
Italy 38
Spain 23
U.K. 82
Total 195
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The results of this filtering are shown in Table 9: most of the Web-sites
taken into account are from the U.K. (i.e., 82, approximately 42.05%), while
only a few Web-sites from Germany and Spain appear to require authentication
from the user, 18 (≈ 9.23%) and 23 (≈ 11.79%), respectively.
We found interesting the result of the filtering process. Indeed, even if the inter-
section of the top 200 Alexa’s Web-sites of the different countries in December
2017 and December 2018 is not null (i.e., from 35% to 45% of the considered
Web-sites are different), it is possible to note that the percentage of the Web-
sites that allows the authentication of users is almost the same. This could
give some interesting ideas to characterize, at a regional level, the diffusion of
Web-sites that allow users’ registration.
Table 10: Password recovery mechanisms adopted by the analyzed Web-sites (December 2018)
Country Web-
sites
(#)
Old Pw New Pw Temp Pw HTTP
link
% of
vulnerable
Web-sites
France 34 0 9 0 3 35.29
Germany 18 0 4 0 3 38.88
Italy 38 8 10 1 3 57.89
Spain 23 2 9 0 2 56.52
U.K. 82 2 8 2 20 32.02
Total 195 12 (6.15%) 40 (20.5%) 3 (1.54%) 31 (15.9%)
The results of the analysis are shown in Table 10 where, as done for Table 6,
each column represents a different method of password recovery adopted by the
analyzed Web-sites—these password recovery methods can be observed from
left to right in decreasing order of severity. Of the 195 Web-sites, 12 Web-
sites (≈ 6.15%) employ the Old Pw password recovery method, thus storing the
passwords in clear, 40 Web-sites (≈ 20.51%) make use of the New Pw password
recovery mechanism, 3 Web-sites (≈ 1.54%) use the Temp Pw password recovery
mechanism, while 31 Web-sites (≈ 15.9%) allow users to recover the password
through an HTTP link, for a total of 44.12% of vulnerable web-sites.
The analysis highlights how, even the Web-sites that are currently among the
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most popular after the entry into force of the GDPR, as they occupy the top
positions of Alexa’s ranking in the period of December 2018, are not compliant
with the regulation, being subject to GDPR’s almost unsustainable fines.
6. Our Solution in a Nutshell
The study discussed in subsection 4.1 show how adversaries who are able
to access the e-mails of the users (e.g., mail service provider-level attackers and
client intruder attackers) are threatening and can easily jeopardize both the pri-
vacy and security of the registered users. In this section, we discuss the details
of Maildust, an open-source module that could be adopted by any Web-site to
provide registered users with a secure password recovery mechanism, prevent-
ing mail service provider-level attacks. Maildust consists of two components, a
server component, and a client component, respectively.
6.1. Maildust Server Module
The Maildust server module, depicted in Figure 1, is composed of four sub-
modules: Registration submodule, Login submodule, Logout submodule, and
Recovery submodule, respectively.
Figure 1: Maildust module
6.1.1. Registration
The registration submodule allows users to authenticate themselves on any
platform that integrates the Maildust module. In this phase, depicted in Fig-
ure 2, the user will be required to provide authentication information, such as
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username, password, and several e-mail addresses. The e-mail addresses of the
user will be used as password recovery resources.
Figure 2: Registration information
6.1.2. Login and Logout
The login and logout submodules allow users with a registered account to
login to and logout from the platform that implements the Maildust module.
Figure 3: Recovery submodule
6.1.3. Recovery
The recovery submodule allows users who have lost or forgotten their pass-
words to access the platform again. The recovery procedure, depicted in Fig-
ure 3, consists of the following operations:
1. The user username, that wants to recover her password, starts the recovery
procedure from the Maildust Recovery submodule.
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2. After verifying that the user is currently registered on the Web-site, the
submodule generates a pseudorandom string, that will be assigned to the
user (as a password).
3a. A secret sharing algorithm (i.e., Shamir’s secret sharing scheme) is applied
to the password. The application of the Shamir’s secret sharing scheme to
the password allows to split it into N tokens such that a partial number K
of tokens (K ≤ N) will be enough to reconstruct the password. The total
number of tokens N is given by the number of password recovery resources
provided by the requesting user during the registration phase.
4a. The tokens are sent to the mail module.
5a. The mail module distributes the N tokens to the password recovery re-
sources (i.e., e-mail addresses) provided by the users during the registra-
tion.
3b. In parallel with the task 3a, a one-way function is applied to the password
(i.e., SHA512).
4b. The hashed password is sent to the information storage module.
5b. The registration storage module associates the password with the request-
ing user, and stores the result inside a database.
The application of the one-way function allows mitigating possible attacks on
the Web-site’s database of registered users. Indeed, in case no operations are
performed on the password before storing them, an attacker able to access the
Web-site’s database of registered users would read the users’ password in clear.
Although the passwords associated with the users are pseudorandom strings
generated by the Maildust submodule (i.e., associated with the user only on the
Web-site in question), the attacker could easily obtain the credentials of all the
users and impersonate them on the Web-site.
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Figure 4: Client module
6.2. Maildust Client module
The Maildust client module, depicted in Figure 4, is composed by two sub-
modules: a mail recovery submodule and a secret reconstruction submodule,
respectively.
1. The user, having started the Maildust recovery procedure on a Web-site,
requested the Maildust client module to recover the new password.
2. The Mail Recovery submodule allows recovering the tokens that have been
distributed over the mail addresses of the user, provided as password re-
covery resources during the Maildust registration phase.
3. The tokens are sent to the Secret Reconstruction submodule, which com-
bine them to reconstruct the password of the user. Similarly to the split of
the password, the reconstruction of the password is based on the Shamir’s
scheme. Indeed, with just K tokens over N (K ≤ N) is it possible to
successfully reconstruct the password.
4. The new password is returned to the user, that has the opportunity to
access the Web-site again.
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Table 11: Password Recovery Mechanism Limitations
Pw Recovery
Mechanism
Remember
Security
Details
Use
more
devices
Trust
people
Trust the mail
service
provider
Security questions 3 7 7 7
2-Factor Auth. 7 3 7 7
Prev. used pw 3 7 7 7
E-mail-based 7 7 7 3
Vouching [6] 7 7 3 7
Maildust 7 7 7 7
6.3. Implementation
Given the modularity of the code and the possibility to easily integrate it
in each Web-site, we decided to implement the Maildust server module inside
a Docker container. Containers technology, providing near bare-metal perfor-
mance with respect to virtualization, is becoming a standard approach to dis-
tribute applications, allowing to run multiple versions of applications on the
same machines [21]. We decided to use Docker that, with more than 105 billion
container downloads [8], is currently leading the market. The Maildust Web
server has been implemented over Flask [22], a lightweight microframework for
Python, while for applying the Shamir’s secret sharing scheme we relied on
the open-source code published on GitHub, which is part of the secret-sharing
project2. The client module has been implemented in Python 3.6 language,
adopting libraries useful to manage the reading of received e-mails, such as
imaplib3 and email4.
2https://github.com/blockstack/secret-sharing
3https://docs.python.org/3/library/imaplib.html#module-imaplib
4https://docs.python.org/3/library/email.html
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6.4. Usability
Our Maildust solution, besides being effective against mail-service provider
level attacker, does not impact negatively on the usability and, therefore, on
the user experience. Table 11 depicts the limitations for each of the password
recovery mechanisms:
• Security questions: This mechanism requires the user to remember
her security answers. There is a trade-off between the questions the user
chooses and the level of security the mechanism can guarantee. Indeed, on
the one hand the user makes no effort to remember trivial questions such
as “what was the name of your teacher in the primary school” or “what is
your mother’s maiden name”. However, on the other hand, the attacker
could likely acquire such information in little time given the current level of
social media exposure. This makes harder the choice of security questions,
thus leading to the difficulty of remembering the answers.
• 2-Factor authentication: The 2-Factor authentication mechanism re-
quires two factors to authenticate a user. It takes into account both “some-
thing the user knows” and either “something the user has (e.g., a physical
token or a smart card)” or “something the user is” (e.g., fingerprints or
retinal scan). In the current implementations, Web-sites ask the user for
a password (something she knows), and to confirm the access with her
smartphone (something she has). Even if smartphones are increasingly
widespread, there may be situations where the user needs to recover her
password and does not have the second device available.
• Previously used passwords: This mechanism requires the user to re-
member one (or a set of) previously used password(s). Besides its limita-
tions (e.g., the user may not remember any of the previously used pass-
words), this password security mechanism presents possible severe security
problems (e.g., informed attackers may know some of the previously used
passwords of the victim).
37
• E-mail-based recovery password: This represents the most common
password recovery mechanism currently adopted by the Web-sites. Once
the password has been forgotten or lost, the user triggers the password
recovery procedure and the new log-in information (e.g., the old password,
a new password, a temp password, an HTTP/HTTPS link) are sent to
the mail address of the user. This mechanism is effective provided there
is trust in the mail-service provider. In our previous work [27], we showed
how the mail-service provider level attacker represents one of the most
viable and dreadful attacks users are currently exposed to.
• Vouching [6]: This password recovery mechanism requires a registered
user to rely on trustees, people previously appointed by the account holder,
that will have the role of identifying her. These people will be contacted
in case the password has been lost or forgotten, and they will be asked to
perform the identification of the requesting user. This mechanism presents
some availability issues (e.g., trustees may not be available in case of
emergency) and privacy issues (e.g., there is the need to trust trustees).
• Maildust: Our solution allows registered users to recover their passwords
without remembering security details, neither requiring the users to rely
on additional devices, nor trusting either people or mail service providers.
In its simplest implementation, Maildust just requires to install a program
that allows automatically recovering the tokens the Web-site has sent to
the different e-mails chosen by the account holder, followed by the au-
tomated password reconstruction, that is requiring a very mild cognitive
load on the user side. It is worth noting that the installation of the client
module, although it improves the usability, is not strictly required to enjoy
the benefits of Maildust. Indeed, the Maildust server module, instead of
the password reconstructed by the Maildust client module, could accept
the tokens sent to the account holder by e-mail. Once received the tokens,
the server module could apply the Shamir’s secret sharing scheme algo-
rithm to reconstruct the password, verify it, and allow the access to the
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user.
Finally, being the solution open-source, it is subject to public scrutiny and
consequent improvement.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we have shed light on the weaknesses of Web-based password
management systems. The findings have been collected via a longitudinal study
run over some of the major EU Web-sites. The resulting scenario sounds a
loud alarm bell: some 28% of the analyzed Web-sites are exposed to critical
threats, while more than 44.12% do show some severe vulnerabilities. To cope
with the above threat we have proposed Maildust: a solution for password
management and recovery that solves some of the critical issues current Web-
sites are affected by. In particular, we have provided a thorough design and
analysis of the proposed solution that, leveraging sound security primitives,
information spreading, and flexible tuning of the system parameters, allows
users to tailor the solution to their perceived level of risk.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first of its kind solution, and it comes
with an open-source proof-of-concept. We have shown how Maildust do solve the
above-cited security issues, and we believe that our decision to release the source
code of our solution will allow researchers from both industry and academia to
build on it, to enhance the degree of security and privacy of users of on-line
Web-sites to the level they are entitled to.
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